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Martinez, the Iraq War seemed a demonstration of American invincibility to the
Libyans (Martinez 2007: 45), and it now became evident to the Libyan regime
that if France, Russia and Germany had been unable to prevent the invasion of
Iraq, then this meant the unilateral power of the United States was without limit
(2007: 45). Libya certainly feared that it could become the next target in a US
campaign to alter power relations and regimes in the region, and that WMD pro-
grams as well as support for terrorism were becoming too dangerous.
Immediately prior to the US-led invasion of Iraq, Libya made contact with
the US through British brokerage in order to discuss a dismantling of the Libyan
WMD capacity.15 Talks were arranged and British and US inspectors went to
Libya. In October, the issue was accentuated by the interception of a German
cargo ship carrying centrifuge parts to Libya. In December, Libya agreed to
eliminate its entire WMD arsenal and allow UN inspections of key sites.
In an interview with CNN, Muammar Gadaffi stated that although the pro-
grammes would have been for peaceful purposes, the Iraq War may have influ-
enced the Libyan decision to get rid of them completely (CNN, 22 December
2003).
The WMD programmes, of which the nuclear programme appeared to have
been underestimated by the US and other intelligence agencies (CNN 19
December 2003), had been part of the Libyan balancing strategy throughout the
1990s and became the centre-piece in its new strategy in the beginning of the
twenty-first Millennium. Libya maintained its chemical and biological pro-
grammes and renewed efforts to further its nuclear programme during the 1990s
in spite of its withering ability to do so as a result of the Soviet disintegration
and sanctions, which rendered it difficult for Libya to obtain spare parts and
additional equipment. These efforts were also limited by the consequential eco-
nomic decline. During those years, Libya deemed it necessary to secure itself by
means of a nuclear programme. It was weakened by the loss of its Soviet ally,
and its relationship with the US was clearly confrontational. Libya pursued a
strategy of ambiguity, but it was a less offensive version than the Iraqi strategy
and virtually restricted its signals to assurances that any nuclear programmes
were exclusively intended for peaceful purposes.
By the turn of the Millennium, Libya s cost benefit analysis had changed. In
the first place, the developments in the Lockerbie case held promise that Libya
would reap important benefits by escaping sanctions and become re-integrated
into international political life. In the second place, the 2003 War against Iraq
sent a message that Libya could be the next target for an overwhelming inva-
sion. Instead of devoting resources to a programme that was far from completion
and extremely dangerous to pursue because it could invite invasion, Libya chose
to abandon it and reap the benefits from becoming internationally re-integrated.
Another gain to the Gadaffi regime was its survival, which was endangered by
external threats, including US policy to promote regime changes, as well as
internal threats, including the domestic rise in militant Islamism in the context of
social decline and a general Islamist ideological wave.
The Middle East 125
In the course of a few years, Libya thus changed course from hard balancing
to soft bandwagoning with respect to international terrorism as well as the
pursuit of WMDs. It had challenged the world order and the US by building up
its non-conventional military arsenal and by means of sub-national violent
operations. This hard-balancing strategy was replaced by soft bandwagoning
after Libya changed course and complied with crucial US demands regarding
those two key issues in the US world order. Regarding the peace process, Libya
also changed its policy from support for militant Palestinian groups and rejec-
tion of the results of the process to criticism but acceptance of the Palestin-
ian authorities.
Libyan strategy from the end of the Cold War to 2007 was thus one of slow
but continuous adaptation from a strategy of hard balancing, via a trend towards
soft balancing from 1999, towards soft bandwagoning from 2003, which became
possible politically due to the regime s firm grip on Libyan politics.
Syria
When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Syria had to balance a series of con-
cerns. American influence was on the rise in the region, and the close US-Israel
alliance complicated matters for Syria. Siding with the coalition would turn pre-
vious Syrian policy towards the US upside down and hamper its image as a
radical Arab state. On the other hand, joining the coalition might lead to an
improvement in Syrian-American relations, thereby facilitating peace negotia-
tions with Israel. As Raymond Hinnebusch wrote, the end of the Cold War
implied that Syria was exposed to a power-imbalance in Israel s favour and left
without the military option (2003: 213). To Syria, US brokerage had therefore
become a potentially necessary path forward (2003: 113). Joining the coalition
would also further weaken its Iraqi rival (2003: 213; Dawn 2003: 175). The
Syrian-Iraqi rivalry had lasted for a generation, and the Syrian presence in
Lebanon was challenged by General Aoun s militia, which was supported by
Iraq (Freedman and Karsh 1993: 96).
As Drysdale has pointed out, the Syrian regime had always recognized the
need for superpower backing to overcome Syria s fundamental weakness,
particularly in relation to Israel (1993: 278). On this background, Syria opted
for joining the international coalition that the US had began assembling
immediately after the invasion. Syria contributed 14,500 troops to Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and it remained part of the coalition right to
the end, despite Iraqi attempts to promote the Arab cause and split the
coalition.
The only proposed alternative was the notion of an Arab approach , which at
the time symbolized the attempt to create an alternative to the international
coalition and use military means to liberate Kuwait. However, the Arab
approach was not endorsed by the oil-rich Gulf states, from whom Syria was
hoping for financial assistance, and [t]hese states were quick to reward Syria for
its participation in Desert Storm (Shad and Boucher 1995: 84). Indeed, the
126 The Middle East
Syrian participation in the coalition produced political rewards and financial
benefits, and the Syrian US relations were much improved.
The Syrian participation in the coalition, its military contribution and its
policy changes clearly qualify as hard bandwagoning.
The next major issue was the Madrid Conference and the initiation of the
Arab Israeli peace process. In the late spring of 1991, The US formally invited
the parties involved in the Arab Israeli Palestinian conflict to Madrid to kick-
start the peace process. While the preparations for Operation Desert Shield took
place, the US had stated that it would invest greater effort in the peace process
when the Iraqi problem was solved. The Madrid Conference became a corner-
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